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Gary Shapiro

World, Earth, Globe
Geophilosophy in Hegel, Nietzsche, and Rosenzweig

In an interview given a few weeks after the attacks of September 11,
2001, Jacques Derrida interrogates the nature of what is popularly called
globalization. 1 He directs critical attention to the nai've assumption that rapid
transportation, expanded commerce, and instantaneous communication are
leading to a condition of homogenization and world community. Derrida
rejects the end-of-history scenario advanced by writers such as Francis
Fukuyama, in The End ofHistory and the Last Man, according to which liberal
democracy and benevolent capitalism will establish a happy cosmopolitan
world. He prefers to use the French term 111011dialisatio11 to preserve a sense
of the human world, as opposed to the reductive scientistic notions of the
planet or the cosmos. In doing so he retains some of the force of Husserl's
Lebe11swelt or of Heidegger's concept of the world as the ineluctable horizon
of human life.
In his critique of current concepts of globalization, Derrida points out
that the very processes of trade, communication, and transport are producing
greater inequalities around the earth, and that these inequalities are ~pectacular,
that is, that the very media essential to the process we call globalization
make these inequalities vividly clear. The interview is a rich conspectus of
the themes of Derrida's political thought, perhaps most penetrating in his
thinking the concepts of the event, as that which arrives, and of futurity,
the Zu-kzmft or l'ave11ir, that which is to come. I will not discuss this theme
directly, but I hope readers will hear resonances of Derrida's questions
in this exploration of three thinkers who embody distinct and competing
approaches to understanding what it might be for the world, earth, or globe
1

Jacques Derrida, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides," in Giovanni
Borradori, ed., Philosophy in a Time of Terror (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2003).
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to move toward the condition of being a meaningful whole. I deliberately
use three different terms here, both to respect the usage of the three thinkers
I want to discuss - Hegel, Nietzsche, and Rosenzweig - and to maintain a
certain contact with Derrida's insistence on the importance of the names
and language that we use - or better, that uses us - as we try to make sense
of things. One of the provocative suggestions in Derrida's "Autoimmunity"
interview is that there is more than a punning connection between "territory"
and "terror." In both French and English the etymological dictionaries note
that territory may not derive from the Latin terra, as we could easily assume,
but from terreur (cf. Oxford English Dictionary). That is, those who would
make an illegitimate incursion into a tenitory, owned by another, ought to
feel some terror. Derrida also suggested that territoriality loses much of its
political force in the era of globalization or mondialisation, characterized as
it is by mobility, flexibility, and transferability (with the important exception
of strategic resources like oil, which provide continuing reasons for states
and corporate powers to occupy or fight for territory).
With Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy (in The Creation of the World), I think
one of the crucial tasks in thinking about what we call globalization and the
many concepts related to it is to understand the language, the discourse, in
which we speak or might speak. I turn to three thinkers who have begun to
develop such concepts. The most recent text that I will begin to explore, Franz
Rosenzweig's essay, "Globus," was written about one hundred years ago.
Yet it offers a philosophical account of boundaries and what Nietzsche called
the direction of the earth. It has a special interest, I think, because it gives
voice to a moment of indeterminacy, written as it was by a German soldier
on the Balkan front in 1916 when the war's outcome was uncertain. Even the
question of whether it should be called a world war was unanswerable. Such
turning points in the history of the earth or world or globe can be instructive
as we attempt to comprehend the crisis of the earth.
What does it mean to live on the bounded, inscribed earth, an earth of
borders and boundaries? Is the creation of boundaries the work of the artist
or the devil - or both? I cite two texts that help to problematize this question.
In his essay on "Walking" Henry David Thoreau fantasizes about "a people
who would begin by burning the fences and let the forest stand!" And he
goes on to recount a vision: "I saw the fences half consumed, their ends lost
in the middle of the prairie, and some worldly miser with a surveyor looking
after his bounds, while heaven had taken place around him, and he did not
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see the angels going to and fro, but was looking for an old post-hole in the
middle of paradise. I looked again, and saw him in the middle of a boggy,
stygian fen, surrounded by devils, and he had found his bounds without a
doubt, three little stones, where a stake had been driven, and looking nearer,
I saw that the Prince of Darkness was his surveyor." 2 To this I will add two
lapidary statements by Deleuze and Guattari: "Thinking takes place in the
relationship of tenitmy and the earth"; "[the artist is] the first person to set
out a boundary stone, or to make a mark." 3 I should mention that Thoreau
occasionally made his living as a land surveyor, so perhaps he qualifies as
both devil and artist.
I propose to consider three experiments in geophilosophy. I borrow this
term from Deleuze and Guattari (DG), who thought of Nietzsche as its
inventor. They distinguish it from three other approaches to philosophy. DG
suggest that thought has largely been conceived either by its orientation to
the object, the subject, or the other subject. If Plato and Aristotle embody a
philosophy of the object, Descartes and Kant are philosophers of the subject,
and Levinas and Habermas are philosophers of the other subject. Each
of these pairs is famously different, but they coincide according to DG's
surprisingly apt categories. Geophilosophy, then, would differ from these in
that it conceives thinking as taking place in the relationship of territory and
earth.
Now we ask, what is the ground, which I have just tentatively called the
earth, on which the devils or artists do their work? There is no simple answer
to this question; here, as elsewhere, we need to recall Denida's injunction: we
are always dealing with "more than one language." If Kant could constrnct
a philosophical architecture, do we know what the ground was on which
he claimed to build? Is histmy concerned with a world of hierarchically
ordered nation-states that establish themselves on an otherwise contingent
geographical basis, as Hegel has it? Should we rather be suspicious, as
Nietzsche was, about whether "peoples and fatherlands" might be obstacles
to the transformation of a humanity that would trnly become loyal to the
earth? Or must we, with Rosenzweig, acknowledge that the finite globe itself
.;,
2
3

Collected Essays and Poems (Library of America, 2001), 230.

What is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994) p. 85; A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 316.
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has from the beginning called for a teleological development, the reverse
perhaps of Hegel's, in which the goal of history, with all its wars, is to become
geo-graphia, the final and inclusive inscription of a common territory?

For Hegel, geography is only the condition of history. It does not determine
the story of freedom, but merely lays out the ground on which that st01y
emerges. Mere ground is aujgehoben in the concrete universality realized
in the development of states. World-hist01y is the highest development of
objective spirit, a realm in which the state actualizes human freedom. The
world, then, is something that emerges from human life on the earth; it
presupposes a certain geography to which it is not reducible. Only with states
is world-history possible and world-history is exclusively concerned with
states. Hegel's restrictive conception of world-history has been obscured by
many Anglophone commentators and translators; some of the latter blur the
issues by translating Weltgeschichte as "universal history." But Hegel is clear:
The state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth. In this sense the state is the precise
object of world-history in general. (/ 42)
In world-history, however, we are concerned with "individuals" that are nations, with
wholes that are states. (I 16)

For Hegel the concepts "world" and "world-history" are highly singular,
unifying, and exclusive. In his most systematic account of the place of worldhistory in the Encyclopedia he describes the movement of spirit as realizing
"the absolute final aim of the world" where spirit "becomes to the outward
eye a universal spirit - a world-spirit" (E 549). World-history is the totality
of states, and the succession of world-historical states is the home ground of
Absolute Spirit - art, religion, and philosophy. Hegel famously compares
the Oriental, Classical, and Germanic worlds in which one, some, or all are
free - varying realizations of freedom all achieved through states. The life
of states is contrasted with the existence of a "people" or "folk" (Volk), or,
speaking more precisely, the state is the telos of a people, one sometimes
achieved and sometimes not. For Hegel the mere Volk is not a subject of
history: "A Volk with no state formation (a mere nation/Nation) has, strictly
speaking, no history - like the Volker which existed before the rise of
states and others which still exist as wild nations [als wilde Nationen]"
(E 549; Hegel makes similar claims in the lectures, see I 16, 42, 50).
A word concerning Hegel's reference to "mere nations" and "wild nations"
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is in order. Nation is an adaptation of a Latin term, whose verbal root is
11ascere, to give birth. Nations as such then are nothing but human beings
of common ancestry, linked by natality, or genealogical affiliation. Hegel
suggests that a nation may become a people, with some cultural coherence
and shared values, and so enter a path of realizing and focusing itself as
a state.4
Why are migrations and wanderings specifically excluded from worldhistory and why do migrants and wanderers tend to remain in the status of
mere or wild nations? The root intuition seems to be that a world-historical
people must stay in its place. The state must have sovereignty over a given
te1Titory, which is the prerequisite for crystallizing the spiritual meaning of
its people. Without the state there are simply wild nations living on the earth;
there is as yet 110 world. Hegel could say of the "wild nations" what Heidegger,
in The Fu11dame11tal Co11cepts of Metaphysics, said of animals, that they are
weltarm, world-poor. When English translations render Weltgeschichte as
"universal history," I assume that the aim, as in Carl Friedrich's introduction
to Sibree's translation of the Philosophy of HisfOI)', is to downplay Hegel's
political theology, his idea that "the state is God's march [Ga11g] through the
world" (l 42).
World-historical existence requires a state which is settled in a te1Titory.
So it initially seems strange that Hegel emphasizes how the Germanic
world, which enables the full flowering of Spirit and state, begins with
barbarous, wandering, predatory peoples - Goths, Visigoths, and so on. Yet
Hegel implies that these groups are no different than any others; no Volk
enters history until engaged in the process of state formation. Hegel makes
4

Nietzsche is well aware of the complex textual and linguistic history of Nation,
Volk, and related terms. In Gay Science 146 he notes that "the names of Volker are
usually terms of abuse," and goes on to remark: "The 'Germans': this originally
meant 'heathen' [die Heiden]; that is what the Goths after their conversion named
the great mass of their unbaptized kindred tribes [die grosse Masse ihrer 1111geta11.ften
Sta111111verwandten], in accordance with their translation of the Septuagint in which
the heathens were designated with a word that in Greek means 'the peoples' [Volker];
see Ulfilas." The original term in the Hebrew scriptures is gay, used often in the
singular to refer to the Jewish nation or people [e.g., Genesis 12:2], but in the plural
goyim referring to non-Jews or Gentiles. While the term has a neutral sense, in this
context it has taken on a pejorative one in later usage, and Luther typically translates it
as "heathens." The Latin Vulgate uses gens, the Septuagint ethnos. Revised versions
of Luther's Bible generally substitute Nationen for Heiden.
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German barbarism a virtue, claiming it was the Germans' strength to begin
by absorbing and appropriating, unlike earlier historical peoples who begin
with an internal development:
The Greeks and Romans had reached maturity within, before they directed their
energies outwards. The Germans, on the contrary, began with self-diffusion deluging the world, and overpowering in their course the inwardly rotten, hollow
political fabrics of the civilized nations. Only then did their development begin,
kindled by a foreign religion, polity, and legislation. (H 341)

The very being of the German people is their transformation through
encounters with the other, so they are uniquely suited to confirm Hegel's
concept of the true identity as the identity of identity and non-identity. They
seize Rome and appropriate Christianity almost thoughtlessly, but - such
is the cunning of history - they are transformed in the end by what they
have captured. They are predatory subjects who will be transformed by their
object. On Hegel's account, this heritage allows the Germans, through the
Reformation and the development of the modern state, to spiritualize the
secular. Their wandering, migration, and nomadism become subordinated to
the process of state formation in which religion is essential.
Commenting on his contempora1y world of the 1820s, Hegel implies that
the US is not a genuine state and has only a starkly contractarian and atomistic
parody of a real constitution. It must be one of those republics destined for
the dustbin of history. Hegel sought to explain how this simulacrum of a state
exists, because he cannot consistently dismiss gross and obvious facts as
mere appearances. He argues that the territorial expansion of the US serves
as a safety valve through which the excesses of a state not grounded in a Volk,
or given unity by monarchy and religion, nevertheless continues (I 89-90).
Mobility and cultural indeterminacy, ordinarily enemies or predecessors of
the Hegelian state, are here invoked to save the appearances, to explain a
state which is not a true state. Forty years later, the Hegelian D. F. Strauss
amplified this verdict, arguing that the US Civil War and its aftermath had
demonstrated the ontological instability of the United States. With the US
division into red (Republican) states and blue (Democratic) states, along
with current and brewing conflicts over energy, water, immigration, and
the fundamentalist social agenda, a Hegel of the new millennium would
ask whether this experiment of a self-designing, federal constitutional
republic without a religion could be expected to continue indefinitely. Hegel
famously declared that America is the land of the future, while declining to
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make specific projections of what that future would be. While he invoked
Minerva's owl in claiming nothing more than retrospective knowledge,
his remarks on the US show that he was not averse to excluding certain
possibilities from the world's future. However, the persistence of a secular,
multicultural republic, still not swept away by the movement of worldhistory, should be an incentive to examining Nietzsche's interrogation of
Hegel's intertwined conceptions of state and world.
Questions about Hegel's statist geophilosophy intensify when we
examine what he says about Islam in The Philosophy of World Histmy. Just
as he thought the US could not continue indefinitely as a loosely federated,
non-monarchical republic lacking an established religion, so he believed
the days of Islam as a significant player on the stage of world history had
ended hundreds of years earlier. I note that in both cases Hegel's evaluations
of world historical viability are based largely on issues of space, territory,
and mobility. With regard to Islam, he embeds such territorial questions
in a logical strncture that purports to explain the emergence of the postclassical European state. Hegel's Germanic world involves three moments
- the elements (governing its early formation), the middle ages (in which
feudalism eventually gives way to monarchy), and modern times (marked
by Reformation, Enlightenment, French Revolution, and reconstitution of
the post-revolutionary state). In this triadic strncture (perhaps followed more
obsessively by his note-taking students and editors than by Hegel himself),
Islam appears as a middle term in the first triad that analyzes the emergence of
the medieval state in the form of Charlemagne's empire. The argument goes
like this: The presupposition of the Christian Germanic world is the migration
of barbarian tribes or groups. These Goths, Visigoths, Vandals and others are
merely paiticular; they and their movement ai·e ai·bitrary from the standpoint
of Geist, determined merely by geography, immediate opportunity, or the
whim of warlords. As these nations begin to "take firm root" (in territories)
they are still characterized by a "dull and narrow intelligence," which splits
everything into "a multitude of chance contingencies ... a tangled web of
convention" (H 355). The special virtue of the nomadic Germanic barbai·ians
is their receptivity to the classical culture and especially the Christianity of
the declining Roman world.
Yet the Germanic appropriation is limited by its particularism, and so the
European movement as a whole requires the shock of extreme universality
that comes with the rise of Islam. As Hegel puts it,
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[In this] political edifice of chance, entanglement, and particularity, the ve1y opposite
direction necessarily made its appearance ... in the revolution of the east, which
destroyed all particularity and dependence, and pe1fectly cleared up and purified the
soul and disposition, making the abstract One the absolute object of attention and
devotion, and to the same extent pure subjective consciousness. (H 356)

This notion of the abstract One is a familiar topos in Hegel, associated
typically with Judaism and Islam, and illustrated by the impossibility of
describing or representing God; hence the iconoclastic refusal of visual
images in religious art. In the expansion of Islam and its concept of the
universal wmna, Hegel detects the vanishing of "all limits, all national and
caste distinctions" (H 357). On his account, this universality is enabled by
the identification of the Arabs and the deserts where "nothing can be brought
into a firm and consistent shape" (H 357). Here Hegel sees nothing but an
episodic succession of wars, caliphates, and kingdoms where "nothing firm
abides" (H 358). The consequence is that the Islamic empire was easy prey
for invading Seljuks and Mongols; that is, one mobile assemblage of people
was necessarily at the mercy of other migratmy or nomadic groups. In the
1820s Hegel can pronounce that
At present, driven back into its Asiatic and African quarters, and tolerated only in
one corner of Europe through the jealousy of the Christian powers, Islam has long
vanished from the stage of history at large, and has retreated into Oriental ease and
repose. (H 360)

It is then not surprising that Francis Fukuyama, championing the Kojevian

"end of history" reading in 1992, at the high point of US triumphalism,
does not know how to integrate the Islamic countries of the world into his
analysis. His metanarrative simply brackets the case of Islam, seeming to
acknowledge that it exceeds his framework.
It would be easy to ridicule Hegel's parallel dismissal of what he sees
on the one hand as the disorganized multitude of the US, enabled only by
the safety valve of westward expansion, and on the other, the impossible
project of Islamic empire which is based on the amorphous desert with its
wandering nomads. Yet perhaps a more critical understanding is possible;
such an analysis would look more closely at Hegel's crncial but undeveloped
concepts of geography, space, and territoriality.
First, might Hegel be correct in attdbuting the persistence of the US
in its republican, secular form to territorial expansion? Hegel wrote in the
1820s before US conquests in wars with Mexico and Spain, the acquisition
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of Hawaii, Alaska, and various outposts around the world. If the US is
now recognized as an empire, by analysts on both right and left, is this not
because it extends its military and economic territ01y to all continents? Why
must empire be limited to geographically continuous areas? Perhaps in the
immediate post-Napoleonic period in which Hegel lectured empires were
indeed in decline, and he may have been misled by his teleological concept
of hist01y to take this as an irreversible tendency.
Second, might we consider a contemporary revision of Hegel's thesis
that political Islam is doomed because of its affiliation with the amorphous,
indeterminate, shifting sands that comprise the space of the desert? As
many analysts suggest, the emergence of instantaneous communication
networks and rapid air travel have produced a new virtual space in which
we constantly discover fresh forms of mobility and power. Certainly there
would be no "global war on terror" as George W. Bush called it, unless this
space were actively in play. In 1950, reflecting on the course of World War
II and the Cold War then taking shape, the German political theorist Carl
Schmitt outlined what he saw as three major forms of political hegemony,
international law, and warfare. In The Nomos of the Earth he schematized
these as distinct forms of the nomos (fundamental law, but more primordially
territorial division, establishment of boundaries). The nomos at first took
the form of the division of land masses; after the impetus to navigation,
trade, and colonization triggered by the European discove1y of the Americas,
the more comprehensive focus was centered on the commerce and law
of the sea; the twentieth century saw the rise of air power; even in 1950
Schmitt saw that this could be expanded to extra-planetary space. Might
the virtual and ubiquitous network of communication, finance, organization,
and strategy - made possible like earlier metamorphoses of the nomos by
technological innovations - be a fourth way of stmcturing and deconstructing
the boundaries of the earth?

If Hegel's geophilosophy is necessarily retrospective, Nietzsche's is a
"philosophy of the future" (Zu-kunft or advent), a thought of the direction of
the earth (Sinn der Erde) tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Nietzsche
calls on his readers to attend to the direction of the earth, the earth understood
as the inevitably plural site of mobile human habitation, the earth of nomads
as well as states. While most readers have seen this as simply a call to
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honor the this-worldly body and its passions, for Nietzsche earth must be
understood also in a fully geopolitical and geophilosophical sense. If the
great events that punctuated world-history according to Hegel are only
stages of the development of the state in Chlistian Europe, and its partial
anticipation in Asia, Greece, and Rome, could there be an event of the earth?
How might we be vigilant in awaiting and seizing the moment or kairos of
that event?
Nietzsche challenges Hegel's notion that peoples are now in their proper
places, organized by state and religion, and exhibiting a hierarchical order
in their realization of the freedom that is the purpose of world-history. For
him, the sense of history does not move from east to west while the peoples
remain stationary: the peoples move in all directions, both ways between
north and south, and exhibit internal movements, intermingling, mixing,
and sometimes homogenizing, producing what we have recently been wont
to call multiculturalism, hybridity, transnationalism, and cosmopolitanism.
Nietzsche observes the rise of nationalism and its appeal to myths and
ideologies of fatherland; he also notes the scare tactics used to justify war and
states of exception. Yet he witnesses as well the emergence of transnational
"good Europeans" and discerns on the horizon the gradual collapse of the
nation-state and the rise of a humanity capable of raising the question of the
direction of the earth.
Nietzsche deliberately speaks of the earth rather than the world. He was
exasperated by the Hegelians when they invoked the concept of "world,"
"world-history," or "world-process" (this last term was used by an early target,
Eduard von Haiimann). Nietzsche's ctitique is ultimately anti-theological.
Among his famous quips is "I am afraid we have not gotten rid of God
yet, because we still believe in grammar" (TI "Reason" 5). Let us read this
alongside another aphorism that stresses the relation between God and world:
Around a hero everything becomes a tragedy, around a demi-god everything becomes
a satyr play; and around God everything becomes - what do you think? perhaps the
"world"? (BGE 150)

So world is a theological concept, as is Hegel's state, both being among
those shadows of God that we have yet to dispel (GS 108). If for Hegel
"the state is the march [Gang] of God through the world," for Nietzsche the
earth is a human-eaith of mobile multitudes that can prepare a way for the
post-human. Nietzsche's "great politics" of the eai·th constitutes a response
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to Hegel's theologico-political treatise Philosophy of World Hist01y and its
later adaptations.
Nietzsche turned away from the Hegelian concept of world, entangled
as it is with that of the state, and toward a notion of the earth as the most
general site of human life. Earth, then, is a political concept for Nietzsche.
For a politics of the earth, the state is not an ultimate goal, but one among
a number of social and political fmms whose genealogy we can trace and
whose dissolution we can envision. Despite the fervent, noisy nationalism
of the early Bismarck era, he argues that there is a real counter-movement to
statism, as Europeans become increasingly mobile or "nomadic," loosening
traditional ties and identities. Nietzsche repudiates Hegel's "so-called worldhistory," which excludes wanderings and migrations; he takes nomadism to
be an indisputable facet of European modernity:
Trade and industry, the post and the book-trade, the possession in common of all
higher culture, rapid changing of home and scene, the nomadic life now lived by all
who do not own land - these circumstances are bringing with them a weakening and
finally an abolition of nations. (HH 475)

Since the nation state conceives itself as a population of common ethnic origins
and culture, it finds itself in an intrinsically unstable position, as mobility
and mingling conttibute to forming a "mixed race" (Mischrasse). There is
no point in resisting the inevitable. In his vocabulary the nomadic generally
designates a collective rather than an individual mode of tenitorialization.
Nietzsche notes that the main factor retarding the withering away of the
national state is fear: its exaggeration or fabrication of external or internal
threats to the population's security. These furnish excuses to declare a state of
exception, in which constitutional or traditional liberties are ovenidden and
the sovereign unity of the state affirmed - as in the Bush regime after 9/11.
Hegelian monarchy, with its theological affiliation, is being replaced by the
national security state. Nietzsche speaks of a "Not- und Belagerungszustand"
(HH 475), the equivalent of Carl Schmitt's Ausnahmezustand. Fifty years
later Schmitt was to define sovereignty in these terms: the sovereign is the
one who declares the exception. Schmitt offered this definition in his book
Political Theology, which argues for a parallel between the sovereignty of
God and the state.5 Nietzsche could have taken the equation differently: just
5
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2005).
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as the madman who announces the death of God tells us that this scarcely
comprehended news is still on the way, so the state is in a long-term process
of dissolution, one of God's lingering shadows.
Nietzsche foresees a long period of "transitional struggles," during which
"the attitude of veneration and piety" toward the state will be undermined, as
it comes to be seen in an increasingly pragmatic and utilitarian perspective
(HH 472). Much government work will be reassigned to "private contractors"
- that's "outsourcing"- another sign of the gradual "decline and death of the
state." On the post-state and post-Hegelian earth "a new page will be turned
in the storybook of humanity in which there will be many strange tales to
read and perhaps some of them good ones." Just as the domination of the
organizing principle of the racial clan gave way to the family and then to the
state, so humanity will eventually hit upon "an invention more suited to their
purpose than the state."
Nietzsche's Europe is in crisis as it struggles with the collapse of
Christianity, the emergence of democratic attitudes and practices, the threat
of nihilism, and the possible rule of the herd and the last man. In Beyond
Good and Evil Nietzsche sees the emergence in Europe of "an essentially
supra-national and nomadic type of person who, physiologically speaking,
is typified by a maximal degree of the art and force of adaptation" (BGE
242). 6 While this tendency may lead to homogeneity and the production of
a type prepared for "slave!)' in the most subtle sense," other aspects of the
development point in different directions. Mixing, wandering, and migration
also produce a variety of singular hybrids, higher humans like Napoleon,
Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heine, Schopenhauer, and Wagner (BGE 256).
These experimental anticipations of the European Zu-kunft embody diverse
mixtures of traditions and lineages. Although Europe "wants to become one,"
the "truth" of this desire is, at least for now, the proliferation of singularities.
Accordingly, in the concluding aphorism of "Peoples and Fatherlands,"
Nietzsche emphatically declares that "this is the centwy of the multitude
[Menge]!" This multitude is not, as some translators have it, identical with
the masses.7 The multitude is diverse, masses are relatively uniform. The
6

For a fuller discussion see G. Shapiro, "Beyond Peoples and Fatherlands," Journal
of Nietzsche Studies 35136 (2008): 9-27.

7

For example, both the first and most recent translations of BGE, by Helen Zimmern
and Judith Norman (Cambridge), translate Menge in BGE 256 (and occasionally
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multitude is formed by a mixing of races, cultures, ethnicities, and the like.
This might result eventually in the formation of herds and masses, but more
complexity is possible. Exemplary here is Nietzsche's discussion of the
emergence of the Greeks from a mixing of Mongols, Semites, and others.8
The chapter on "Peoples and Fatherlands" should be read as a thorough
critique of Hegel's Weltgeschichte in which Nietzsche challenges Hegel on
the state, human mobility, the persistence of national types, and the supposed
east to west movement of the Weltgeist, that ghost or phantom, which is
dispersed by the rise of a multitude who will not stay put to observe its passage.
We need look no further than the US-Mexican border to see the pertinence
of this reconfiguration of the Hegelian story in terms of a north/south axis
which does not coincide with the rise of states. Among many testimonies
I cite Gloria Anzaldua's book, Borderla11ds!La Frontera, exploring the
complexity of that borderland, not merely a scar but an open, hemorrhaging
wound left by the Mexican-American war, in which both the duality and
the hybridization of US and Mexican peoples is further complicated by the
tensions and mixings of Native American, Chicano, and mestiza strains,
and inflected personally by the author's lesbian identification. Anzaldua
elsewhere) as "masses." Other problematic English translations of Menge abound,
e.g., Hollingdale's version of HH 472. See Menge in Grimm's Worterbuch: http://
germazope.uni-trier.de/Projects/WBB/woerterbuecher/dwb/wbgui
See another crucial passage employing the distinction: "Statistics prove that there
are laws in history. Indeed, it proves how common and disgustingly uniform the
mass [Masse] is. You should have tried statistical analysis in Athens for once! The
lower and more non-individual the mass [Masse] is, the statistical laws are that much
stronger. If the multitude [Menge] is finer and nobler, the law goes to the devil" (KSA
7 .642; cf. KSA 4.18, 7.119, 9.462, 12.96).
8

KSA 8.96. Yirmiyahu Yovel says that "there is a marked lacuna in [Nietzsche's]
thinking - the lack of a positive philosophy of the 'multitude'. Politics is not about
the happy few, but about those ordinary people, the modern mass or 'herd' which
Nietzsche did not care about and did not make the topic of any positive philosophical
reflection." Yovel goes on to say that this political lacuna left (and still leaves)
Nietzsche open to abuse by fascists, Nazis, and the like. Yovel conflates multitude,
herd, and mass in "Nietzsche and the Jews: The Structure of an Ambivalence," in
Nietzsche and Jewish Culture, ed. Jacob Golomb (New York: Routledge, 1997), 132.
On what could be called Nietzsche's affirmative concept of the multitude or Menge,
see Hubert Cancik, "'Mongols, Semites, and the Pure-bred Greeks': Nietzsche's
Handling of the Racial Doctrines of his Time," in Nietzsche and Jewish Culture,
55-75, and Shapiro, "Beyond Peoples and Fatherlands" (note 6 above).
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transvalues the borderlands, finding vibrant multiplicity in a territory
marginalized by the devilish surveyors of Thoreau's vision.
Nietzsche emerges as a theorist of nomadism, migration, immigration,
diaspora, cosmopolitanism, and hybridity. He is better equipped than
Hegel to understand the demise or evisceration of the monarchical state
with established (Christian) religion. Nietzsche could see a self-described
hybrid (or "mutt") like Barack Obama as a paradigmatic voice of and for the
multitude. We should also note that the Menge is not a universal class, but
is conceived as an audience, which is not coextensive with the population
at large (BCE 263, 269). In BCE 256, which announces the century of the
multitude, it is introduced as the audience of the higher humans (Napoleon to
Wagner) listed there. Goethe constructs a dialogue about such a multitude in
Faust's "Prelude in the Theater," where the Menge is described as relatively
educated, widely read, yet mixed in mood and background.9 The century of
the nomadic multitude, then, as it frees itself from peoples, fatherlands, and
states, is not so far from the society of the spectacle, making allowances for
technological innovations in its promulgation and marketing. The bad news
is that the multitude can be an audience for "tyrants of all sorts, including
the most spiritual" (BCE 242), and the good news may be that at present
they are still sufficiently diverse to resist a powe1ful religious reformation
like the German one that brought Europe the disaster of religious war and
the equally disastrous (in Nietzsche's eyes) modern state system (AOM
226). However shifting and unstable the earth's multitude may be, its very
diversity may be sufficient - if we are lucky - to resist the more monolithic
forces of contemporary assassins and crusaders with their unitary visions of
the world. 10

Yet what does it mean to be loyal to the earth, to pledge one's troth (Treue),
and become the earth's disciple (Jiinger), as Nietzsche's Zarathustra urges?
Perhaps it begins with thinking the earth fully in its finitude, an event of
9

Goethe, Faust, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Anchor, 1962), 68-81 (lines 33242); see also Faust's speech in the Easter scene 180-182 (lines 903-940), which
emphasizes the variety and energy of the Menge.
JO Cf. Gmy Shapiro, "Assassins and Crusaders: Nietzsche After 9/11," in Reading
Nietzsche at the Margins, ed. S. V. Hicks and A. Rosenberg (West Lafayette: Purdue
University Press, 2008), 186-204.
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thought that becomes both possible and imperative in the age of new wars
Nietzsche saw on the horizon. So I turn to a compelling but incomplete text
composed in 1916 during the "Great War," which was to be recognized
as the first of the world wars. This is Franz Rosenzweig's essay "Globus:
Studies Toward a World-Historical Theory of Space," which was published
many years after his death. 11 Rosenzweig is not generally recognized as a
geophilosophical thinker. He is known mainly for his religious philosophy, as
developed in his maste1ful and enigmatic work, The Star of Redemption, the
frnit of his immersion in Geiman idealism, theology, and a personal strnggle
that led to a renewed commitment to Judaism. As a volunteer in the German
army, serving on the Balkan front, Rosenzweig wrote a series of meditations
on the meaning of the war, the most important of which is "Globus."
Rosenzweig's geophilosophy extends his concern with the question
of orientation, a theme articulated in German Idealism. To answer Kant's
question "What is Orientation in Thinking?" Rosenzweig turns to theology.
To put the point quickly and schematically for now, he worries that prevailing
forms of philosophy do not offer absolute orientation, but only relative forms.
In October 1916 (while composing "Globus") Rosenzweig was engaged
in a philosophical correspondence with Eugen Rosenstock; the exchange
is recognized now as a decisive turning point in his thought. Rosenzweig
asked Rosenstock how he conceived the relation between nature and
revelation, and Rosenstock replied by turning the question to the subject of
orientation:
Natural understanding, then, knows front and back, left and right, and helps itself in
this enclosure with a net of analogies. It makes comparisons and thus limps from one
place to the next in this vast space .... The resolution not to take one's own position
in this quarter of space as the center of knowledge, but as conditioned from above this renunciation of being omphalos kos111011 [the navel of the cosmos] is no longer
a matter of the natural human understanding but is the means within us that makes
revelation to, in, and for us possible.12

11
12

Page numbers that follow refer to this text (Gin abbreviations).
Eugen Rosenstock, letter of October 28-30, 1916; cited in Judaism Despite

Christianity: The Letters 011 Christianity and Judaism between Eugen Rose11stockH11essy and Franz Rosenzweig (Schocken, 1971), 119-120. On the question of

orientation I have found the following collection of Rosenzweig's essays with
editorial comments very helpful: Franz Rosenzweig, Philosophical a11d Theological
'vVriti11gs, ed. Paul W. Franks and Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000).
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Inspired by this answer, Rosenzweig sees the significance of revelation in a
new way, drawing additional resources from Schelling's critique of Hegel's
philosophy. During the war years 1916-17 he pursues two parallel paths,
one philosophical-theological, the other geophilosophical-geopolitical, each
of which insists on the importance of absolute orientation, and the historicaldialectical path to achieving such orientation - yet on neither of these tracks
makes explicit reference to the other. These are two great moments or zones
of indeterminacy; "Globus" arises from an intense time of possibility, when
the event of the war was defining itself and opening a future.
On the smface, the war was generated by European states protecting
their boundaries and privileges; it led to redrawing the map of Europe and
lands beyond, new boundaries, and eventually a greater war. As the term
"world-historical" in the subtitle of "Globus" signals, Rosenzweig was
soaked in Hegel's philosophy of history and the state. Before the war he
had substantially completed a pathbreaking study of Hegel's theory of the
state. He saw the Reich proclaimed by Bismarck at Versailles in 1871 as
consistent with Hegel's conception of reason realizing itself in history, while
acknowledging an ambivalence concerning its ability to fully achieve that
realization. When he published Hegel and the State after the war, he added
a foreword and a concluding remark noting that the study no longer had its
anticipated relevance to political and historical actuality. "A field of rnins
marks the spot where the empire previously stood," he confesses in the
foreword. In the concluding remark he continues to speak in the language
of ruin, observing that "We feel the extent to which we are at the end today,
when the century of Bismarck, at whose gate the Hegelian life stands like
the thought before the deed, has collapsed." 13 In the interval between writing
the body of the book, which sought to reclaim the spirit of Hegel (the spirit
of Hegel's spirit, we might say), came the war and "Globus."
In "Globus" Rosenzweig begins by asking whether the conflict is a world
war, as some say. He raises this question in 1916, before the US's entrance
into the conflict, and while its outcome is still in doubt. It cannot be so called
if one judges on the basis of the powers involved, for then neither the US nor
East-Asian nations were belligerents or battlegrounds. Yet "if this name for
the current war cannot be justified on account of the powers involved, it can
be on account of its goals" (G 314). These goals, as he understands them, go
13

Franz Rosenzweig, Philosophical and Theological Writings, 74-75.
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far beyond any explicit aims of the contending parties. While Rosenzweig
gives a detailed account of colonial rivalries and competition for spheres
of influence that were more or less public and understood motives for the
warring nations, what he takes to be the ultimate goal can be nothing less
than the aim of "world-history," namely, the explicit unification of the earth,
or to be more precise, the finite globe. "What we call world-history is nothing
other than the earth's becoming [Werden] an enclosed historical space, a
'world'" (G 314). If this "world" is conceived in Hegelian terms, then it must
be a state, a single state. Is this what Rosenzweig sees on the horizon? One
of the two named divisions of the "Globus" essay is "Okumene: Weltstaat
und Staatemvelt" or "The Ecumenical: World-state and the World of States."
While the essay proceeds without explicitly naming Hegel, it is a radical
critique of the very idea of Hegel's narrative of world-history. Rosenzweig's
"world-historical theory of space" is a counterpart to Hegel's world-historical
theory of time and the state. What he shares with Hegel is an approach to
the meaning of human history that stresses the importance of "great events,"
major turning points, the result of unanticipated consequences of actions
undertaken for reasons seemingly unconnected or at odds with their results what Hegel called "the cunning of history."
Hegel saw world-histmy as the production of a hierarchical order of states,
each securely resting in its own territmy; he was forced into extraordinary
maneuvers to explain and contain facts of nomadism, migration, and
diaspora that threatened to dismpt his stmy. Rosenzweig begins by taking the
existence of boundaries and borders, the basic constituents of sovereignty,
as necessary starting points that become transitional phases within a larger
development in which they are destined to disappear. World-histmy began,
he claims in the first sentence of the essay, when someone claimed a part of
the earth as his own, thus establishing Grenzen (borders), and the distinction
between "mine" and "yours" (G 313). But this is only the beginning:

1,

The earth is thus determined, from creation on, to be covered [inscribed, iiberzagen]
with borders. Being bounded [Begrenzbarkeit] is its nature, boundlessness only its
final goal, but as the final goals of history always have a firm and visible substructure
in natural things, so it is here. The boundlessness which remains the final goal of the
earth is the sea's own from the very beginning. (G 313)

Although no names are mentioned, we could say that Rosenzweig is playing
Schelling against Hegel, a move well developed in his philosophical theology.
Despite their common post-Kantian origins, Schelling came to see Hegel's as
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a "negative" philosophy, one that constrncted a complex set of concepts and
categories oblivious to the necessarily dark, unthought Abgnmd out of which
all bounded things like concepts and categories emerge. In "Globus" the earth
itself (Rosenzweig also terms it the Erdbal[) is such an Abgrund, a sheer
given, unknown in its depths, a surd that requires a "positive" philosophy,
involving an "absolute" or "radical empiricism" (to invoke both Schelling
and William James). The earth resists full articulation, but we can situate its
relation to the realm of the bounded. The sea plays this role of the unbounded
in relation to the land as divided among states; the whole earth itself is the
Abgnmd vis-a-vis the state-defined world of Hegel's world-history.
Rosenzweig finds himself (knowingly or not) with a geophilosophical
position that parallels Nietzsche's critique of Hegelianism. The earth
becomes world, and the aim of world is to become earth again, but in a way
that involves an awareness of its specific, finite, and surd character. Globus,
then, can be defined as the earth comprehended and unified in its finitude.
So Rosenzweig is still a Hegelian of sorts, because he sees the destiny of
Globus in a higher form of reflection and consciousness. His narrative is
marked by stages of increasing consciousness of the growing unity of the
earth. These realizations are embodied in the equivalent of Hegel's worldhistmical figures, indeed they often are the same figures, but they are so
for different reasons. So Alexander is important not simply for overcoming
the limited form of the Greek polis and establishing the idea of a universal
empire (Hegel), or for fusing the cultures of east and west (Nietzsche), but
most significantly for seeking to go beyond the bounds of the Medite1rnnean
world to what the ancients thought of as the Ocean surrounding the land
at its outermost perimeter. Caesar, on this analysis, had a similar vision
that coincided roughly with the Christian production of the concept of
the oikomene, the common world (Rosenzweig notes that beginning with
Augustus, Caesar's successors failed to understand, let alone pursue, this
project). Whereas for Hegel, such men are world-histotical figures because
of their contribution to new forms of the state (in which they destroy and
supersede self-contradictory regimes, notably republics and democracies),
for Rosenzweig it is their geographical vision, adumbrating a unified globus,
which allows us to mark the epochs of world-history.
Recount the full, intricate story Rosenzweig tells is not possible here. It
involves the play of universality and particularity in medieval church-state
relations, the early modern balance of power among European sovereignties,
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the emergence of modern European nation-states, the so-called discove1y
of America, colonial and imperial expansion, incorporation of the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans into the world sphere, the rise of the United States, and
the conflict of the British Empire with Germany and Austria-Hungary that
precipitated the Great War in which he served and wrote. Suffice it to say
that read alongside (or better against) Hegel's world-history, this nairntive
is not centered on freedom (as Hegel understands it) but on events mai·king
transformations in the comprehension and hegemony over the earth as a
whole. To cite his comprehensive statement of principle: "In both land and
sea, therefore, the unity of the earth is the driving force of historical process
[Geschehens]" (G 314).
History is a matter of dialectical inversions and transformations, as with
Hegel. For example, in the age of mercantile nationalism and initial colonial
expansion, states strangely identify their inner identities with what is most
external, their competitive standing in relation to other states: "With this
[mercantile] concept of power, which finds its boundaries neither within
itself nor in an idea of the world [Weltgedanken], but only in the power of
the other, or the neighbor, the inner productive source of external power, the
most external aspect of the inner life of the state, steps into the foreground:
the economy [Wirtschaft]" (G 325).
What then is the nature of the unity that the globe approaches? In
the concluding sections of "Globus" Rosenzweig makes sweeping yet
penetrating suggestions that bring together the oldest ideas of the earth
with his contemporary situation in the midst of the war, which he now
acknowledges as a world war. He distinguishes two archaic conceptions of
the earth, Homeric and Biblical. In Homeric cartography, the MeditelTanean
sea is bounded and surrounded by a circumference of land, as known to
the Greeks and their successors. Beyond that surround of land lies Ocean,
thought generally and indefinitely as the final limit of the earth. In the
Biblical map, which Rosenzweig finds in the prophets and ancient kingdoms
of the near east, the earth is a vast land mass with uncertain outer bounds,
containing within it various bodies of water. While later Greek thinkers
speculated intelligently that the earth was round, this received no experiential
confirmation until the voyages of Columbus and other eai'ly navigators.
Given the hundreds of thousands of years of human history, it is only very
recently that we have been set the task of coming to terms with the finite
sphericity of the En/ball.
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The work required by this task has largely been accomplished by sea. That
is, humans ventured into what was seen as the unbounded in order to seize
territories, extending old boundaries or creating new ones. This brings the sea
itself within bounds, hence the concern in the modern era with the law and
freedom of the sea. This takes us from the problem of piracy, important for the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to the conflict of British and German
fleets in the twentieth, as Germany seeks to limit the power of the British
Empire while establishing a parallel dominion of its own. It was German
submarine attacks on US vessels, which were disregarding an embargo on
Britain and her allies, that officially led to US entrance into the war (shortly
after Rosenzweig broke off the essay) and to Woodrow Wilson's effectively
declaiing it a world war (US historians tend to downplay the fact that the US
respected the British "no shipping" zone which was enforced by mines rather
than submmines). "Globus" makes no predictions about whether the US and
Japan (two significant sea powers then still neutral) would enter the conflict.
But Rosenzweig does offer an explanation of their neutrality up to that point.
It confirms his conception of the ultimate meaning of the war and the spatial
world-histmy of which it is a pait, namely, to fully realize the unity of the
earth - that is, roughly what we call globalization. At the same time it mm·ks
and defines the kairos, the event-al turning point of the war.
Rosenzweig's analysis hinges on two claims which at first sound
eccentric: (1) the war is essentially about Africa, and (2) the fortunes of
Britain and her allies depend on enforcing a misreading of the nature of the
globe. These claims are more plausible and more philosophical than they
initially appear. A US reader may be surprised to hem· that the war was about
Africa, given the iconic images of European trench wa1fare that dominate its
representations.But in large part the conflict had to do with whether Germany
could establish its own colonial empire and restrain Britain's quest for global
hegemony. Ge1many had launched a number of colonial ventures in East
and West Africa, joining rather late in the European stampede to occupy
and exploit "the dark continent," a phrase that acquires a philosophical
sense in Rosenzweig's analysis (see his discussion of the Berlin Congress
of 1883). From a geopolitical standpoint he m·gues that having a foothold
in the Cape (South Africa) was an essential component of Britain's empire,
because of its crucial position on the circuit of Canada, Britain, India, and
Australia. The Boers had achieved independence in a struggle with Biitain
a few years earlier, aided by the neighboring German colony; yet during the
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Great War, after fierce internal stmggle, they sided with Britain. As the "dark
continent," Africa could also be understood in Schelling's sense as being an
exemplary Abgnmd, the unknown, unmapped aspect of things. To say that
the war is about Africa is to say that it is about who will be "lords of the
earth" (Nietzsche's phrase) and that it involves coming to terms with what
the unified globus will be.
Rosenzweig's second thesis is that Britain has strengthened its position
by publicizing a distorted cartography, one that obscures the globe itself.
From a strategic point of view, he argues, one of Britain's principal aims
must be to keep the US and Japan neutral or possibly gain the US as an
active ally. It does this by persuading these two powers, whom he regards
as natural enemies facing each other across the Pacific, to see the war as an
internal European affair. If the US and Japan were to understand that global
hegemony is at stake, beyond the European theater, they might engage in the
conflict in unpredictable ways, endangering British plans. The Pacific Ocean
was relatively underdeveloped as a scene - Rosenzweig is fond of terms
like Schauplatz - of global competition. Keeping it that way (safeguarding
British interests in Australia and Eastern Asia) obviously favored the
British. Rosenzweig's geophilosophical analysis is that Britain succeeded
in representing the world according to Mercator projection, with the globe
transfotmed into a two dimensional representation with Europe at the center
and the US and Japan at the extremes. The Pacific is then divided in such a
way that the observer overlooks its role as a medium and possible object of
contest. The tmth, on the other hand, is the earth as a globe. "Both, Japan
like America, seem to forget that they have a 'back' [Riicken] and could 'turn
around'. If they were to do so, two future enemies would look each other in
the eye" (G 367). Rosenzweig seems to suggest, without being completely
explicit, that we can see here the difference between British empiricism
or analysis and a philosophy like German idealism, notably in Schelling's
version, which assumes the task of thinking the whole. One could speculate
that something analogous happens now, in so far as world crisis is seen to be
located in the (poorly named) Middle East; this distracts attention from the
long-term competition between the US and China.
Rosenzweig proposes a geographical reversal of Hegel's world-histmy.
Rather than treating geography as the initial staging point of histmy, he
sees the unified earth with its continents and seas as history's telos. Today
talk of earth's finitude brings to mind questions concerning climate change,
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depleted natural resources, environmental pollution, and overpopulation. It
remains to be seen whether these issues will be addressed by the ecumenical
world order that Rosenzweig believed destined, or whether national states
jockeying for position by war and other means will succeed in disrupting
the emergence of a political order corresponding to the singular "Globus." 14
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